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The health–security nexus has become a dominant narrative within health policy 
over the past two decades.1 While debates on this topic vary in levels of analysis 
from the global to the national to the individual, as well as in the definition of what 
can be considered a security threat and in the treatment of the process of becoming 
securitized,2 I argue that more recently the global health security narrative, associ-
ated governance regime,3 and the ensuing path dependencies have shifted in three 
ways. First, the concept has been broadened to the extent that a multitude of 
health issues (and others) are constructed as threats to health security. Second, 
securitizing health has moved beyond a rhetorical device to include the direct 
involvement of the security sector. Third, the performance of health security has 
become a security threat in itself. These considerations, I argue, alter the remit 
of the global health security narrative. The global health community needs to 
recognize this shift and adapt its use of security-focused policies accordingly. This 
poses important considerations for future developments in health security policy, 
particularly relating to the longevity of the concept and the need for greater 
sustainability in global health security interventions. 
To support this claim, this article traces the development of health security 
conceptually. Whereas others have sought to chart development through institu-
tional expansion, policy change or its historical development from the Interna-
tional Sanitary Conferences,4 here I seek to highlight the different uses of the global 
health security narrative. In doing so, I demonstrate that, despite an assumption 
of a narrow, commonly recognized understanding of what constitutes a global 
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference 
(Toronto, 2019) and Global Health Security 2019 (Sydney, 2019). I thank the attendees for their comments and 
feedback. I also wish to thank Simon Rushton and Sonja Kittelsen for their discussions on this article during 
the writing process.
1 Colin McInnes and Anne Roemer-Mahler, ‘From security to risk: reframing global health threats’, Interna-
tional Affairs 93: 6, Nov. 2017, pp. 1313–37.
2 Colin McInnes and Kelley Lee, Global health and International Relations (Cambridge: Polity, 2012); Christian 
Enemark, Disease and security: natural plagues and biological weapons in east Asia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).
3 Sara E. Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott and Simon Rushton, Disease diplomacy: international norms and global 
health security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015); Simon Rushton, Security and public health 
(Cambridge, UK, and Medford, MA: Polity, 2019).
4 Steven Hoffman, ‘The evolution, etiology and eventualities of the global health security regime’, Health Policy 
and Planning 25: 6, 2010; David Fidler, ‘From international sanitary conventions to global health security: the 
new International Health Regulations’, Chinese Journal of International Law 4: 2, 2005, pp. 325–92.
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 h
ttp
s
://a
c
a
d
e
m
ic
.o
u
p
.c
o
m
/ia
/a
rtic
le
-a
b
s
tra
c
t/9
5
/5
/1
0
9
3
/5
5
5
6
7
5
2
 b
y
 L
o
n
d
o
n
 S
c
h
o
o
l o
f E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 u
s
e
r o
n
 0
5
 N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r 2
0
1
9
Clare Wenham
1094
International Affairs 95: 5, 2019
health security concern, the project of global health security has never referred to 
a unitary whole, but is a dynamic concept that has altered depending on context, 
pathogen and who/what is at risk. In doing so, I recognize that we have reached 
a critical juncture in global health security and that now is the time to reflect on 
what the term can offer and what are the limitations of the policy response in 
relation to the meaningful control of infectious disease and sustainability of global 
health. I propose a new typology for global health security to distinguish between 
global health emergencies, global health security threats, global health security 
risks and global health security concerns—a categorization that offers a degree of 
nuance hitherto absent from the global health security narrative.
Beyond rhetoric, fundamental shifts are occurring within global health security, 
including an encroachment of military activity into this area of health and an 
increase in the very real risks posed to those undertaking health security work. 
These shifts raise concerns in relation to entrenched policy path dependencies in 
global health security and questions whether securitized policy is always the most 
useful response. As a thought experiment, this article considers whether the use 
of differentiated terminology within the global health security narrative to reflect 
the context, risk or activity associated with particular situations may reduce some 
of the negative externalities associated with the contemporary practices in global 
health security that I outline below. 
Unbundling health security
Health and security have been increasingly connected through the evolution of a 
particular predominant approach to a global health security narrative,5 which has 
become entrenched in the global health landscape and policy-making discourse.6 
This process follows the securitizing logic of the Copenhagen School,7 according 
to which any issue can be perceived as a security threat ‘not necessarily because 
a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as a threat’ to a 
receptive audience.8 Thus, the key to this understanding of health securitization 
is not the actual ‘threat’ of a pathogen but a successful speech act or narrative 
‘through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political 
community to treat something as an existential threat to a referent object by a securi-
tising actor, [generating] endorsement of emergency measures beyond the rules that 
would otherwise bind’,9 or a suspension of so-called ‘normal politics’. A narrow 
understanding of the global health security narrative suggests that pathogens can 
be considered threats when characterized by fast-moving transmission, little scien-
tific knowledge of the disease, no known treatment or cure, or high mortality 
or morbidity, or when they are associated with a particular visceral fear of pain 
5 Davies et al., Disease diplomacy.
6 Institute of Medicine, Emerging infections: microbial threats to health in the United States (Washington DC: National 
Academies Press, 1992).
7 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: a new framework for analysis (Boulder, CO, and London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998).
8 Buzan et al., Security, p. 24.
9 Buzan et al., Security, p. 5 (emphasis added).
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or suffering.10 When a pathogen of this kind emerges, the legal and normative 
workings of the global health security regime (re)produce a particular policy 
response which is focused on preparedness for, detection of and response to acute 
infectious diseases.11
Yet the meanings of both ‘health’ and ‘security’ in the global health security 
narrative have varied depending on the immediate pathogen posing a threat, 
reflecting the dynamism of this concept. For HIV/AIDS, the security–health 
nexus constructed a narrative based on the more traditional security threat posed 
to militaries with high prevalence of the virus (with infection rates as high as 50 
per cent in some African forces12) which may affect the ability of the army to 
perform its function and could therefore have a direct impact on state security.13 
This perpetuated a further concern that HIV/AIDS might lead to state instability 
as societal structures crumbled owing to lack of capacity, overwhelming demand 
on social provision and fearmongering, leading to a potential breakdown of social 
norms.14 Although Fourie has argued that these societal impacts have yet to be 
witnessed,15 McInnes and Rushton show that there had to be some real risk under-
lying this construction of the broader health security narrative,  to get an audience 
to accept the security process.16
For pandemic influenza and related illnesses, including major global outbreaks 
of SARS, H1N1 and H5N1 influenzas, this conceptualization of security moved 
beyond military concerns, recognizing the (potential) impact of a pathogen on the 
global population, and importantly the risk to western populations. Moreover, 
the construction of the security narrative recognized the risk to a state’s or region’s 
economy arising from alterations to patterns of travel and/or trade.17 This is a 
different understanding of security from that associated with HIV/AIDS, for 
which the referent object of the threat remains the state; yet importantly the 
manifestation of the threat changes to reflect differing objectives of the global 
health security narrative. 
For Ebola, the logic of security is quite different. Owing to rigorous infection 
control protocols, Ebola would not pose the same threat to states in the global 
10 Enemark, Disease and security; Andrew Price-Smith, The health of nations: infectious disease, environmental change, 
and their effects on national security and development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
11 Rushton, Security and public health; United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, The global 
health security agenda (Atlanta, GA, 27 Jan. 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/security/ghsagenda.htm. 
(Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 19 July 2019.)
12 Colin McInnes and Kelley Lee, ‘Health, security and foreign policy’, Review of International Studies 32: 1, 2006, 
pp. 5–23.
13 Colin McInnes and Simon Rushton, ‘HIV/AIDS and securitization theory’, European Journal of International 
Relations 19: 1, 2013, pp. 115–38; Stefan Elbe, ‘Risking lives: AIDS, security and three concepts of risk’, Security 
Dialogue 39: 2–3, 2008, pp. 177–98; M. David, ‘Rubber helmets: the certain pitfalls of marshalling Security 
Council resources to combat AIDS in Africa’, Human Rights Quarterly 23: 3, 2001, pp. 560–82. 
14 McInnes and Rushton, ‘HIV/AIDS and securitization theory’.
15 Pieter Fourie, ‘The relationship between the AIDS pandemic and state fragility’, Global Change, Peace and 
Security 19: 3, 2007, pp. 281–300.
16 McInnes and Rushton, ‘HIV/AIDS and securitization theory’.
17 Thomas Abraham, ‘The chronicle of a disease foretold: pandemic H1N1 and the construction of a global 
health security threat’, Political Studies 59: 4, 2011, pp. 797–812; Melissa Curley and Jonathan Herington, ‘The 
securitization of avian influenza: international discourse and domestic politics in Asia’, Review of International 
Studies 37: 1, 2014, pp. 141–66.
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North that promote the dominant global health security narrative,18 and therefore 
its construction as a security threat reflects yet again something different from 
HIV/AIDS and pandemic flu. Enemark19 suggests that the security focus within 
the west Africa Ebola outbreak of 2014–16 was on securing circulation of the 
pathogen within a public health sphere to protect the population, an important 
tenet which may not have been so evident in previous outbreaks. Conversely, 
President Obama suggested that the outbreak threatened state stability in post-
conflict west Africa.20 The Ebola outbreak which started in 2018 in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) threatens regional stability owing to cross-border risk 
of the disease’s spread but this is not constructed as a risk with the same immediacy. 
The DRC has exceptionally weak state and health infrastructure, without the 
same levels of investment in post-conflict reconstruction as witnessed in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia; this may, in part, explain the delay in the construction of this 
latter outbreak as an emergency. An alternative explanation might be that by 2014 
the global health security narrative had become so entrenched in global policy that 
it produced a recognized path dependency for the west African outbreak, which 
was therefore inevitably perceived as a security threat. 
A similar path dependency was a driving force for the global health security 
construction of the Zika outbreak of 2015–16. This emerged straight after the west 
African Ebola crisis, and thus amid a heightened global normative assumption of 
securitized pathogens;21 yet here the use of the global health security concept was 
different again. Instead of concern for the military, trade or travel restrictions, or 
the circulation of pathogens, the security process, as epitomized in the declaration 
of the Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), was related 
not to the virus, but to the uncertainty surrounding the causal link between the 
virus and microcephaly, the innocence of newborns as the affected population, 
and concern for the forthcoming Olympic Games in Brazil.
The important point to draw from these empirical examples is the dynamism 
and variance inherent in the use of the term ‘global health security’. This suggests 
that there are multiple grammars of security in the global health security narra-
tive, and that there is a poor vocabulary within the international community to 
describe what global health security entails. I suggest that this variance should 
be reflected in the language used to distinguish different health issues within the 
global health security narrative and to delineate more clearly what response is 
required. This is especially important in contemporary discourse, owing to the 
number of recent developments in both the narrative and practice of global health 
security. 
18 Simon Rushton, ‘Global health security: security for whom? Security from what?’, Political Studies 59: 4, 2011, 
pp. 779–96.
19 Christian Enemark, ‘Ebola, disease control and the Security Council: from securitization to securing circula-
tion’, Journal of Global Security Studies 2: 2, 2017, pp. 137–49.
20 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by President Obama at UN meeting on Ebola’, 25 
Sept. 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/25/remarks-president-obama-
un-meeting-ebola.
21 Clare Wenham and Deborah Barros Leal Farias, ‘Securitizing Zika: the case of Brazil’, Security Dialogue, 2019, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106198 56458.
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While such a differentiation has started to emerge through the language of 
risk,22 I argue that the various terms used to describe outbreak events, including 
global health emergencies, global health security crises, global health security 
threats and global health security concerns, need to be defined more clearly. 
These definitions should be embedded in a collective, institutionalized under-
standing to demonstrate the range of meanings implicit within the expressions 
chosen, including the differing severity of the event and the role of the global 
health security regime, to ensure that an appropriate response is mounted relative 
to the risk posed to global health security in each case. This in turn may limit 
some of the unintended consequences of the global health security narrative that 
I outline below. 
Developments in health security 
This nuancing of ‘global health security’ is required owing to three impor-
tant changes in the last decade. First, what is constructed as a security threat 
has expanded beyond what has been previously recognized by the global health 
security regime, and the new breadth requires a new delineation of terminology 
to allow the rhetorical tool an efficacious response for the next ‘big one’. Second, 
military involvement in health security activities constitutes a move away from 
a global health security narrative based on the logic of the Copenhagen School 
to a more traditional, ‘boots on the ground’ security response to an external 
threat. This has tangible repercussions for global health security operations, and 
risks jeopardizing future acceptance by global audiences of global health security 
interventions if they perceive them as military interventions, and thus also 
jeopardizing the ability to enact extraordinary measures which may be required. 
Third, global health security is now facing an ontological threat as those under-
taking this activity have themselves become security targets.
Everything is a security issue
A key element in understanding the new security–health nexus is the recogni-
tion that too many health issues are now framed within the global health security 
narrative. This entrenched narrative, based on the centrality of the speech act,23 
has been used by a range of policy-makers and practitioners who are aware of the 
political and financial benefits to be derived from elevating an issue to the security 
arena.24 It is important to understand the implications of this expansive move, and 
to ask whether it risks the legitimacy of the concept for limiting the cross-border 
spread of infectious disease and what risks it poses in normalizing security inter-
ventions. Consequently, I argue that it is important to offer a series of rhetorical 
22 McInnes and Roemer-Mahler, ‘From security to risk’.
23 Jutta Weldes, Cultures of insecurity: states, communities, and the production of danger (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999); Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, Terror, insecurity and liberty: illiberal practices of 
liberal regimes after 9/11 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).
24 Rushton, ‘Global health security: security for whom?’.
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distinctions to differentiate the various types of global health security event in 
order to enable us to recognize the ‘big one’ when it occurs. 
While the global health security narrative has, to date, had a narrow under-
standing of what constitutes a health security concern, based on rapid spread, 
unfamiliarity and an absence of effective treatment,25 contemporary discourse 
in and beyond health policy has framed a number of broader issues as health 
security threats. These have included maternal health,26 mental health,27 non- 
communicable disease,28 access to contraception,29 reproductive health,30 
migration,31 food security,32 counterfeit medicines,33 universal health coverage,34 
climate change,35 water and sanitation,36 salty foods37 and even Brexit.38 While 
those who perceive security at the human level may suggest that each of these 
issues may produce individual insecurity, it seems overstretch to attempt to put 
these all onto a global security agenda. 
In one interpretation, this expansion of threats to health security is embodied in 
the WHO’s naming of ‘Disease X’ as a priority research need. As stated, ‘Disease 
X represents the knowledge that a serious international epidemic could be caused 
by a pathogen currently unknown to cause human disease’.39 So ambiguous a 
formulation raises concern that the door might be opened to a range of diseases 
25 Enemark, Disease and security; Price-Smith, The health of nations. 
26 Maisha Reza, ‘Is maternal health an issue of security?’, 2017, https://maishareza.com/is-maternal-health-an-
issue-of-security/.
27 Stewart M. Patrick (and Ryan Fedasiuk), Silent suffering: mental health as a global health priority (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 7 April 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog/silent-suffering-mental-health-
global-health-priority.
28 Amrita Saha and George Alleyne, ‘Recognizing noncommunicable diseases as a global health security threat’, 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 96: 11, 2018; Kostova Deliana et al., ‘Synergies between communicable 
and noncommunicable disease programs to enhance global health security’, Emerging Infectious Disease Journal 
23: 13, 2017; David L. Heymann, ‘The sugar tax—a “nanny state” levy that could save lives’, Daily Telegraph, 9 
April 2018; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘On non-communicable diseases and security’, 
WritePeace blog, 8 Nov. 2011, https://www.sipri.org/commentary/blog/2011/non-communicable-diseases-
and-security.
29 Meba Kagone, Eric Takang, Antoine Ndiaye, Olga Sankara and Ernest Ouédraogo, ‘West Africa reproductive 
health commodity security; country assessment report: Burkina Faso’, ed. John Snow (Arlington, VA: US 
Agency for International Development, 2005), https://www.rhsupplies.org/uploads/tx_rhscpublications/
DOC21.pdf.
30 UN Population Fund, ‘Investing in sexual and reproductive health key to global health security, UNFPA head 
tells World Health Assembly’, 15 May 2007, https://www.unfpa.org/press/investing-sexual-and-reproduc-
tive-health-key-global-health-security-unfpa-head-tells-world.
31 David L. Heymann et al., ‘Global health security: the wider lessons from the west African Ebola virus disease 
epidemic’, The Lancet vol. 385: 9980, 2015, pp. 1884–901.
32 Scientific Advisory Board of the UN Secretary-General, Food security and health, policy brief (Paris: UNESCO, 
2016).
33 Heymann et al., ‘Global health security’.
34 Vageesh Jain and Azeem Alam, ‘Redefining universal health coverage in the age of global health security’, 
British Medical Journal: Global Health 2: 2, 2017, e000255.
35 WHO, Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, Technical discussion on climate change and health secu-
rity, EM/RC55/Tech.Disc.1 (Cairo, 2008), http://applications.emro.who.int/docs/EM_RC55_tech_disc_1_
en.pdf.
36 Kathleen O’Reilly, ‘From toilet insecurity to toilet security: creating safe sanitation for women and girls’, 
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Water 3: 1, 2016, pp. 19–24.
37 Dan Glickman and Ann Veneman, ‘Salty school lunches: our real national security threat’, Chicago Tribune, 28 
February 2019.
38 Danielle Solomon, ‘Brexit and health security: why we need to protect our global networks’, Journal of Public 
Health Policy 40: 1, 2019, pp. 1–4.
39 WHO, List of blueprint priority diseases (Geneva, 2016).
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to muscle in on the health security narrative if political conditions allow, further 
weakening the narrative’s meaning. 
This expansion of the range of issues which have been framed in health security 
terms raises new questions for studying health security. For example, just as critics 
of human security have suggested,40 trying to fit too much under the umbrella of 
global health security may result in the concept becoming diluted or losing the 
political saliency which has encouraged activity, resource generation and decisive 
action in the prevention and detection of, and response to, highly pathogenic 
infectious disease. As Gavin Yamey pointed out, if health security continues on 
its current trajectory, it is only a matter of time before we see ‘toe nail fungus: a 
threat to global health security’.41 
Even so, not all efforts to incorporate new health issues into the global health 
security narrative have been successful. Securitization requires the acceptance of 
the threat by an audience; and while policy-makers may try to securitize any one 
of the concerns listed, through the use of the established narrative, that is not to 
say they will succeed; and indeed, I would argue that none on this list has achieved 
security status as yet.
The irony of this is, however, that various lobby groups and policy advocates 
have used the global health security terminology precisely as a mechanism to 
push their concerns up the political agenda, recognizing that security gets to the 
top levels of decision-making in national, regional and global forums. Yet the 
outcome of hijacking this discourse to serve issues which do not fit the criteria of 
the fast-moving and unknown pathogen is the erosion of the power that the global 
health security narrative may have in the future. The risk for infectious disease 
control is that ‘crying wolf ’ from other health policy areas may have a substan-
tially detrimental impact on the response to a potentially catastrophic outbreak. 
Global health security fatigue becomes a real concern, limiting the acceptance 
of the global health security rhetoric by audiences across the world and in turn 
leading to a failure to endorse emergency measures. Thus, this broadening of the 
health security discourse can actually prove cannibalistic to the concept itself, if 
the global audience either tires of the global health security narrative, or starts to 
accept the expanding securitization formula. 
A counter-argument is that there is a mismatch between academics’ and 
policy-makers’ understandings of what health security is, and how the concept 
was initially conceived. In the foundational World Health Report of 2007, the 
risks posed to health security are defined as ranging from emerging pathogens 
to economic instability, international crises and humanitarian emergencies, 
chemical, radioactive and biological terror threats, environmental change and 
weak health systems.42 Thus, an alternative explanation is not that there has been 
an expansion of issues considered to be health threats, but that the concept has 
40 Ken Booth, Critical security studies and world politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005); S. Neil MacFarlane 
and Yuen Foong Khong, Human security and the UN: a critical history (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2006); Roland Paris, ‘Human security: paradigm shift or hot air?’, International Security 26: 2, 2001, pp. 87–102.
41 Gavin Yamey, Twitter communication @GYamey, 5 November 2018.
42 WHO, World Health Report 2007: A safer future: global public health security in the 21st century (Geneva, 2007).
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not been used to the extent intended by the norm entrepreneurs that championed 
its use.43
What’s more, overusing the global health security narrative perpetuates the 
global health security policy path dependency and increases the likelihood of a 
securitized response as the first course of action, and the likelihood of further 
security risks. Changing the terms of debate within this global health security 
narrative, such as by more clearly distinguishing between global health emergen-
cies, global health security crises, global health security risks and global health 
security concerns, may reduce the need for military involvement in some areas 
of more routine activity, such as preparedness, and thus reduce the ongoing risks 
posed to health security workers. 
Securitizing health or healthifying security?
The traditional approach to understanding health as a security threat is hypo-
thetical. The flexibility within the Copenhagen School means that a pathogen 
doesn’t actually have to pose an objective risk, as long as it is constructed as such. 
Yet, beyond the rhetorical device that produces a policy pathway based on preven-
tion, detection and response, a more recent trend in global health security has been 
the involvement of the military in global health security operations. This takes 
health security beyond a rhetorical tool and represents a new point of departure 
for analysis. 
While militaries have been at the forefront of advances in public health since 
the eighteenth century,44 this involvement largely took the form of medical 
research (as in the US Walter Reed Army Institute of Research), surveillance,45 
or disaster response (following flooding in Pakistan or the Haiti earthquake).46 
However, as Michaud and colleagues point out, ‘the trend of the past two decades 
has been towards greater military engagement in global health [security]’.47 
This trend has included China’s domestic military participation in prepara-
tion for and response to influenza outbreaks,48 Peru’s military-led surveillance 
network, Thailand’s military HIV screening activities,49 Brazil’s militarized 
43 Adam Kamradt-Scott, ‘The WHO secretariat, norm entrepreneurship, and global disease outbreak control’, 
Journal of International Organizations Studies 1: 1, 2010, pp. 72–89.
44 Geoffrey Quail, ‘The debt tropical medicine owes to the military’, Journal of Military and Veterans’ Health 23: 3, 
2015, pp. 18–21.
45 Philip Brachman, Heather O’Maonaigh and Richard Miller, eds, Perspectives on the Department of Defense global 
emerging infections surveillance and response system: a program review (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 
2001), ch. 4, ‘GEIS at the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences, Thailand’.
46 Derek Licina, ‘The military sector’s role in global health: historical context and future direction’, Global Health 
Governance 6: 1, 2012, pp. 1–30.
47 Joshua Michaud et al., ‘Militaries and global health: peace, conflict, and disaster response’, The Lancet 393: 
10168, 2019, pp. 276–86.
48 Hui Ma Ji-Ping Dong, Na Zhou and Wei Pu, ‘Military–civilian cooperative emergency response to infectious 
disease prevention and control in China’, Military Medical Research 3: 1, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40779-
016-0109-y.
49 Jean-Paul Chretien, David Blazes, Rodney  Coldren, Michael Lewis, Jariyanart Gaywee, Khunakorn Kana, 
Narongrid Sirisopana, Victor Vallejos, Carmen C. Mundaca, Silvia Montano, Gregory Martin and Joel 
Gaydos, ‘The importance of militaries from developing countries in global infectious disease surveillance’, 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 85: 3, 2007, pp. 174–80.
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vector control,50 and armed forces management of cholera in Zambia.51 Even so, 
all these instances have involved domestic military activity within a state’s own 
borders and at the discretion of the sovereign government. This is conceptually 
different from the parallel shift in global health security with the involvement of 
international militaries to respond to external infectious disease concerns.
The west African Ebola outbreak of 2013–15 witnessed the deployment of inter-
national militaries from China, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, among others, in the global health security response. This 
represented a gear change for health security and a different modus operandi. The 
deployment of an international military force in a health emergency represents 
a physically securitized practice, beyond rhetoric, with boots on the ground to 
combat a disease threat.52 The remit and activity of the different militaries varied, 
ranging from the building of Ebola treatment facilities, treatment of compatriot 
staff, training of health workers, treatment of locals affected and establishment of 
command-and-control structures for maintaining contact tracing and quarantine 
areas.53
In west Africa, the military were broadly perceived to have been pivotal in 
bringing the outbreak to an end. The discourse of exceptionalism and widespread 
failures around Ebola in west Africa may suggest that drastic times called for 
drastic measures; and the call for the military as an actor of last resort was made 
after other government and international mechanisms had failed to manage the 
response.54 Regardless of the role performed or the justification advanced, these 
deployments are important in a broader analysis of global health security as they 
moved health security beyond the rhetorical threat of disease to a real security 
presence operationally deployed beyond sovereign borders. 
During the Zika outbreak, emerging not long after the west African Ebola 
episode, the (national) military was used as the first option to combat the disease 
threat. The Rousseff government in Brazil galvanized support for this activity 
through bellicose language—for example, referring to a ‘war on the mosquito’—
and in doing so justifying the military’s vital role. Sixty per cent of the national 
armed forces were deployed to combat the Zika virus through extensive vector 
control, fumigation programmes and health education activities.55 This not only 
established the military in a central role in managing health security in Brazil; it
50 Sean Michael Griffing, Pedro Luis Tauil, Venkatachalam Udhayakumar and Luciana Silva-Flannery, ‘A histori-
cal perspective on malaria control in Brazil’, Memorias do Instituto Oswaldo Cruz 110: 6, 2015, pp. 701–18.
51 ‘Zambia president orders military to help fight cholera spread’, Reuters, 30 Dec. 2017, https://uk.reuters.com/
article/uk-zambia-cholera/zambia-president-orders-military-to-help-fight-cholera-spread-idUKKBN1E-
O03X.
52 Michaud et al., ‘Militaries and global health’.
53 Adam Kamradt-Scott, Sophie Harman, Clare Wenham and Frank Smith III, Saving lives: the civil–military 
response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in west Africa (Sydney: University of Sydney, 2015).
54 Sophie Harman and Clare Wenham, ‘Governing Ebola: between global health and medical humanitarianism’, 
Globalizations 15: 3, 2018, pp. 362–76.
55 Government of Brazil, ‘Pronunciamento da Presidenta da República, Dilma Rousseff, em cadeia nacional 
de rádio e televisão, sobre o vírus Zika’, 3 Feb. 2016, http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/
ex-presidentes/dilma-rousseff/discursos/discursos-da-presidenta/pronunciamento-da-presidenta-da-repub-
lica-dilma-rousseff-em-cadeia-nacional-de-radio-e-televisao-sobre-o-virus-zika.
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signalled a broader systematic change for health security in normalizing the use of 
security forces in emergency response to infectious disease. 
This normalization can be seen in other contexts. In Pakistan, the military 
have been deployed to accompany workers delivering polio vaccines in an effort 
to ensure greater distribution and uptake of immunization.56 Similarly in the 
DRC, the military and police have provided escorts to health workers in Ebola 
response efforts.57 Beyond operationalized response to specific outbreaks, the role 
of the military has been elevated to having a seat at the table within the global 
health security regime: militaries have been considered pivotal to the Global 
Health Security Agenda, incorporated in standing committees and action plans 
including those of Bangladesh, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Vietnam.58 Similarly, 
the inaugural Military Health Summit occurred in connection with the first 
major global health security conference in 2019. The result is that the military 
are undeniably and increasingly recognized as a key stakeholder in global health 
security operations.
One question raised by this involvement of the military in health security 
activity is whether they are securitizing health, or simply healthifying security. 
There are several possible reasons for this increased military involvement in global 
health security activity, including the availability of personnel and of biosecurity 
training and equipment, a lack of response capability in the health sector and 
simply the self-fulfilment of securitizing health. It is also important to remember 
that the increasing role of the military in global health security has occurred during 
a period of (relative) peace, and—particularly for western states—it could be that 
the role of the military in health security represents both ‘mission creep’ and the 
need to find ‘jobs for the boys’ to legitimize military spending. For example, 
anecdotal discussions during the west African Ebola outbreak queried the possi-
bility of a link between deployment of the UK military and the planned military 
spending review in 2020.59 This raises a host of concerns about the role of the 
military, and the risks posed to health security by their involvement. First, does 
such involvement defy the Oslo Guidelines, according to which state militaries 
should be used only as a last resort when ‘there is no comparable civilian alter-
native ...  to meet a critical humanitarian need’?60  Second, what would happen 
if an outbreak were to occur when the military are engaged in more traditional 
war-related activities and/or in a location where international or national militaries 
had been recent combatants, as in the DRC? This could create a further risk to the 
56 Ryan Hyland, ‘Polio’s last stand: frantic effort to eradicate Pakistan’s “badge of shame”’, Guardian, 15 March 
2017.
57 Anne Gulland and Louise Dewast, ‘Congo at a knife edge as number of cases of Ebola continues to rise’, 
Daily Telegraph, 23 May 2018; Anne Gulland, ‘MSF condemns “militarised” response to Ebola outbreak’, Daily 
Telegraph, 7 March 2019; David Miliband, ‘The response to DRC’s Ebola crisis isn’t working: here’s what we 
need to do’, Guardian, 15 July 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/15/democratic-
republic-of-the-congo-drc-ebola-crisis-outbreak.
58 Michaud et al., ‘Militaries and global health’.
59 Personal communication with military sources.
60 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Oslo Guidelines: guidelines on 
the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief (2007), https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/
OSLO%20Guidelines%20Rev%201.1%20-%20Nov%2007_0.pdf. 
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maintenance of health security if they were no longer able to perform the role that 
the globe expects of them because their involvement in recent incursions poses 
further security risks.
There needs to be further consideration of when, and under what conditions, 
militaries should be engaged in global health security. Should such involvement 
be kept for just the ‘big ones’, or should it be used for routine activities such as 
preparedness as well? Greater specification of language within the global health 
security narrative could provide clear guidance on the circumstances in which 
military forces can and cannot be used in global health security contexts: for 
example, perhaps for global health emergencies, but not for global health security 
concerns or preparedness activity. 
Risks to health workers in securitizing health
There is clearly an occupational hazard to anyone who responds to an outbreak of 
infectious disease. The number of health care workers who die as a result of the 
care they provide in global health security events is well known, and the high-
profile deaths of leading global infectious disease specialists such as Carlo Urbani 
and Richard Mousoko during major outbreaks have made this risk ever more visi-
ble.61 During the west Africa Ebola outbreak, several NGOs found it hard to recruit 
volunteers to join the response effort for fear of contracting the virus;62 this is one 
reason why the military were required. More recently, the risk to individual safety 
has become manifest beyond infection and through more traditional security 
concerns. Perhaps as a consequence of the increased securitization and militariza-
tion of global health, the blurring of health and security activities now poses an 
ontological paradox as global health security now represents a security risk in itself.
The broader trend of health workers coming under attack is unfortunately 
an increasingly common feature of global health reality. Attacks on health care 
workers have occurred in many areas, including Afghanistan, the Central African 
Republic, Pakistan, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen,63 with combatants unable 
to distinguish between warring factions, military forces and aid workers.64 This 
raises a number of challenges for post-conflict reconstruction, development and 
civilian health, and also for the cost–benefit analysis of military involvement in 
health activity more broadly. 
This trend has also started to become apparent in global health security activi-
ties. A securitized response to health issues tends to focus on the short-term such 
61 Brigg Reilley, Michael Van Herp, Dan Semand and Nicoletta Dentico, ‘SARS and Carlo Urbani’, New England 
Journal of Medicine, vol. 348, 15 May 2003 ,pp. 1951–2; Fiston Mahamba, ‘Militiamen kill senior WHO official 
in attack on Congo Ebola centre’, Reuters, 19 April 2019, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-health-ebola-
congo/militiamen-kill-senior-who-official-in-attack-on-congo-ebola-centre-idUKKCN1RV119.
62 Kamradt-Scott et al., Saving lives, p. 8. 
63 WHO, Surveillance System for Attacks on Healthcare (SSA), 2017, https://publicspace.who.int/sites/ssa/SitePages/
PublicDashboard.aspx; Preeti Patel, Fawzia Gibson-Fall, Richard Sullivan and Rachel Irwin, ‘Documenting 
attacks on health workers and facilities in armed conflicts’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 95: 1, 2017, 
pp. 79–81.
64 Rachel Irwin, Violence against health workers in complex security environments, background paper (Stockholm: 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014).
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as surveillance, disease detection, and the development and deployment of vaccines 
and treatment; and it is these very activities which are now coming under attack. 
Military actors have had to accompany health workers vaccinating children 
against polio in Pakistan, in order to protect them from Taliban fighters following 
the US-led capture of Osama bin Laden using polio workers.65 These troops 
support health care workers in the facilitation and delivery of vaccines among 
the population to reduce the incidence of this major global health security threat 
(which continues to be a PHEIC).66 However, these security forces themselves 
then become a secondary target alongside the health workers they were sent to 
protect, who continue to suffer attacks.67 Accordingly, being part of the global 
health security machinery through the delivery of the polio vaccine poses a dual 
threat—not only that of potentially contracting the disease, but that of physical 
attack owing to your occupation. 
More recently, this ontological crisis was mirrored in the Ebola outbreak in 
west Africa, when community resistance to WHO teams turned violent and some 
WHO workers were killed.68 There are multiple and complex reasons for this, 
among them a lack of meaningful community engagement with locals at the start 
of the outbreak, a deep mistrust of government and wariness of external interfer-
ence among local people suspicious of land appropriation by multinational enter-
prises for resource extraction.69 This violence included attacks on WHO teams 
in Guinea and others driven into hiding in the bush, their equipment subject to 
vandalism and arson.70
A similar security risk is also evident in the current Ebola outbreak in the DRC. 
The outbreak is taking place in a complex political situation on disputed territory, 
with attacks by a number of non-state armed groups on health workers and health 
facilities thwarting efforts to put an end to the epidemic.71 There have been arson 
attacks on Ebola treatment units, attacks on health care workers, and broader insta-
bility and insecurity affecting response efforts. Such attacks have a direct effect on 
disease transmission: if those trying to control the spread of the disease have to halt 
their response activity, the virus is able to spread unchallenged.72
These traditional security risks embedded within global health security activity 
pose a number of concerns. First there is the circular phenomenon whereby those 
65 Saeed Shad, ‘CIA organised fake vaccination drive to get Osama bin Laden’s family DNA’, Guardian, 11 July 
2011.
66 WHO, Statement of the nineteenth IHR Emergency Committee regarding the international spread of poliovirus, 30 
Nov. 2018, https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-11-2018-statement-of-the-nineteenth-ihr-emergen-
cy-committee-regarding-the-international-spread-of-poliovirus. 
67 ‘Pakistan polio: seven killed in anti-vaccination attack’, BBC News, 20 April 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-asia-36090891.
68 James Fairhead, ‘Understanding social resistance to the Ebola response in the forest region of the Republic of 
Guinea: an anthropological perspective’, African Studies Review 59: 3, 2016, pp. 7–31. 
69 Fairhead, ‘Understanding social resistance’.
70 WHO, Ground zero in Guinea: the Ebola outbreak smoulders, undetected, for more than 3 months (2014), https://www.
who.int/csr/disease/ebola/ebola-6-months/guinea/en/. 
71 Vinh-Kim Nguyen, ‘An epidemic of suspicion: Ebola and violence in the DRC’, New England Journal of Medi-
cine, vol. 380, 2019, pp. 1298–9.
72 Adrian Blomfield, ‘Ebola outbreak spreads as war and disease threaten perfect storm’, DailyTelegraph, 26 Oct. 
2018.
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working in global health emergency response themselves become the object of 
a different security threat and find themselves in the firing line. This may have a 
damaging impact on future recruitment into global health security-related activity. 
Second, if health care workers are unable to carry out their jobs, emergency 
response efforts will be limited, increasing the risk to global health security of 
the spread of the pathogen. Such security concerns have had direct impacts on 
the response to Ebola in the DRC, with WHO and MONUSCO forces agreeing 
that the security situation will directly lead to an increase in cases of infection,73 
for example when those undertaking contact-tracing are disrupted in their efforts 
and lose track of their work, which is so vital to the success of any disease control 
strategy.74 Third, there is a broader impact on preparedness within global health 
security. For example, if children are not vaccinated against polio, the risk of 
disease transmission rises. 
Accordingly, we are witnessing an unusual turn in the security–health nexus 
whereby the practice of health security now poses its own security threat. This 
will need to be considered in depth, and a sophisticated management plan devel-
oped that offers a clear way forward to ensure the safety of those working on the 
front line of health security and their ability to carry out their activities without 
coming to harm, as well as to ensure global health security more broadly. This 
will require self-reflection within the global health security regime to identify 
the shortcomings and risks associated with military involvement and to assess 
whether the continued focus on prevention, detection and response remains the 
most suitable policy pathway in the face of more systemic development needs, or 
whether current approaches may in fact perpetuate insecurity and inequalities. 
Emergencization and normalization
Initially, the global health security narrative was used as a rhetorical tool by 
health policy-makers to justify extraordinary measures to combat the rare crisis 
events, leveraging more attention to and financing for responses to emerging 
infectious diseases. However, the increased normalization of the discursive tool, 
which has moved beyond words to operationalized action, suggests that perhaps 
health security is no longer the exception but the norm in global health policy, 
raising questions of its utility as a concept. What will an extraordinary response 
to the next ‘big one’ look like if extraordinary has become the norm? What does 
this mean for dealing with large-scale outbreaks—and, conversely, for the more 
endemic, everyday health issues which may find themselves further relegated 
down the list of prioritized activities in global health? 
One concern is that, with the frequent use of the global health security narra-
tive, the global health community has created a perpetual state of emergency 
and routinized health security to the extent that it barely seems shocked when 
73 ‘DR Congo: insecurity and attacks mean Ebola will keep spreading, warns World Health Agency’, UN News, 
Geneva, 1 March 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/03/1033842.
74 Blomfield, ‘Ebola outbreak spreads’. 
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another health emergency arises.75 Compare, for example, the response to the 
ongoing Ebola outbreak in the DRC and that to the west African outbreak of 
2014–16. It took four meetings of the Emergency Committee of the International 
Health Regulations (IHR) for the DRC Ebola outbreak to be declared a PHEIC, 
despite the legal criteria having been met long before. Moreover, there has been 
considerably less mainstream media coverage of this outbreak globally. Although 
these outbreaks are markedly different in scale and context, the contrast may also 
suggest a fatigue in the global health security narrative.76
I propose that one solution would be to create a typology within the global 
health security narrative to distinguish the different types of concerns. This might 
entail reserving the term ‘global health emergency’ for the really big events, with a 
tiered scale below this level for global health security crises, global health security 
threats and, for smaller issues, global health security concerns, as well as encour-
aging the greater use of regional, national and local language to describe health 
security threats. While this would raise the challenging possibility of those patho-
gens and events lower down the typology not getting the desired attention, and 
the potential for further discrepancies between financing mechanisms and actors 
involved within the tiered structure, the use of relevant language would enable 
global health security to maintain its legitimacy. In effect, this principle is already 
embodied within the PHEIC process and the Pandemic Emergency Financing 
Facility (PEF), each of which is deployed only for an exceptional event. However, 
there is currently a mismatch between these labels and the broader global health 
security narrative—and, importantly, global health security activity. Securitized 
responses are evident prior to PHEIC declarations and beyond PEF-eligible patho-
gens. There should be greater consistency within the global health security regime 
and narrative to reserve the intended power of global health security for those 
situations in which it is most urgently needed. This typology mirrors previous calls 
to include a gradient system in the PHEIC process, to denote exigent outbreaks 
which need international support and increased financing while allowing the 
PHEIC to maintain its power for major events.77
Changing the terminology in this way may also facilitate better evaluation 
of the use of the military in global health security, particularly in more routine 
health security provision, such as preparedness and capacity-building. The reduc-
tion of such activity may possibly—though this is speculative—reduce the risks 
posed to health care workers within health security operations. 
Sustainability
A further point on which global health security needs to reflect is the tendency of 
securitized responses to favour short-term, reactive, fire-fighting policy and 
75 Tine Hanrieder and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, ‘Who decides on the exception? Securitization and emer-
gency governance in global health’, Security Dialogue 45: 4, 2014, pp. 331–48.
76 Janet Baseman, Debra Revere, Ian Painter, Mariko Toyoji, Hanne Thiede and Jeffrey Duchin, ‘Public health 
communications and alert fatigue’, BMC Health Services Research 13: 1, 2013, pp. 1–8.
77 Lawrence O. Gostin and Rebecca Katz, ‘The International Health Regulations: the governing framework for 
global health security’, Millbank Quarterly 94: 2, 2016, pp. 264–313.
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response mechanisms. ‘Parachute’ activities, where financial, human and medical 
resources are pumped into an outbreak location to quell a particular pathogen may 
stop the spread of a disease at that time,78 but do little to systematically address the 
socio-economic factors that make some populations and individuals particularly 
susceptible or vulnerable to disease. This question of sustainability is rarely consid-
ered within the global health security narrative and raises a number of inconvenient 
truths. For example, during the Zika outbreak, the fumigation of vectors and 
destruction of their breeding grounds may have reduced the incidence of the virus 
in 2016–17, but will not prevent future outbreaks. Temporarily destroying vectors 
does not address the socio-economic conditions that allow mosquitoes to thrive—
such as a lack of water and sanitation, poor-quality housing and inadequate civic 
waste management that all could create breeding grounds for mosquitoes, nor does 
it challenge the gender inequalities which are mostly ignored in outbreaks. Taking 
a more sustainable approach in responding to an outbreak, through addressing these 
broader global health security risk factors, might yield longer-lasting success. 
Global health security needs to consider the balance between a short-term focus 
and making lasting changes to improve outbreak preparedness. 
Similarly, the fire-fighting response to managing the west African Ebola 
outbreak was achieved by channelling all national and local health resources and 
activity into Ebola prevention, detection and response. The cost of this was a 
significant reduction in essential primary health services in the affected states,79 
including in childhood immunization programmes and in maternal and child 
health services,80 which raises a number of questions about equity across the 
health system and the impact that a health security event can have across health 
and societal systems. 
The recent move to connect global health security to universal health coverage 
(UHC), as championed by WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom, may offer a 
greater opportunity for sustainability, as the globe moves towards more compre-
hensive, accessible, affordable health care for all. UHC expansion would lead to 
system strengthening in the health sector and would allow for earlier detection of 
infectious disease through routine provision of health care, for example through 
more frequent visits to health services.81 It would also facilitate broader sustain-
ability in the health sector through systematic engagement in response to infectious 
diseases. Yet, while offering hope for sustainability, the instrumentalist nature of 
78 Nathan Yozwiak, Christian Happi, Donald Grant, John Schieffelin, Robert Garry, Pardis Sabeti and Kristian 
Andersen, ‘Roots, not parachutes: research collaborations combat outbreaks’, Cell 166: 1, 2016, pp. 5–8.
79 Bradley Wagenaar, Orvalho Augusto, Jason Beste, Stephen Toomay, Eugene Wickett, Nelson Dunbar, Luke 
Bawo and Chea Sanford Wesseh, ‘The 2014–2015 Ebola virus disease outbreak and primary healthcare delivery 
in Liberia: time-series analyses for 2010–2016’, PLOS Medicine 15: 2, 2018, pp. 1–26.
80 C. S. Wesseh, R. Najjemba, J. Edwards, P. Owiti, H. Tweya and P. Bhat, ‘Did the Ebola outbreak disrupt 
immunisation services? A case study from Liberia’, Public Health Action 7: suppl 1, 2017, pp. S82–S87; Alexan-
dre Delamou et al., ‘Effect of Ebola virus disease on maternal and child health services in Guinea: a retrospec-
tive observational cohort study’, Lancet Global Health 5: 4, 2017, pp. e448–e457; Laura Sochas, Andrew Amos 
Channon and Sara Nam, ‘Counting indirect crisis-related deaths in the context of a low-resilience health 
system: the case of maternal and neonatal health during the Ebola epidemic in Sierra Leone’, Health Policy and 
Planning 32: suppl. 3, 2017, pp. 32–9.
81 Jain and Alam, ‘Redefining universal health coverage’.
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this connection between UHC and global health security, enabling the former to 
draw on the political saliency and financing of the latter,82 also risks conceptually 
broadening health security yet further, opening it up to more criticism on the 
same basis as that directed earlier at the expansive global health security narrative. 
In place of this connection to global health security, UHC could instead be linked 
with another concept elsewhere in the health security matrix, such as a global 
health security threat, and thus garner some of the associated support without 
detracting from the force and utility of the highest ‘emergency’ designation. This 
distinction, and others like it, are important if we are to develop a meaningful 
future for global health security and its diverse meanings. 
The value of health security 
While this article presents a critique of global health security as currently perceived 
and operationalized, I do not suggest that we should move away from global health 
security as a concept. As Rushton points out, that horse has bolted;83 and indeed the 
concept has significant resource benefits—in the United States alone, emergency 
government disbursements in response to outbreaks have included US$1.1 billion 
for Zika and US$5.4 billion for Ebola in west Africa.84 More recently, the UK 
Department for International Development has committed considerable financing 
to the DRC Ebola outbreak, and called on other G7 states to do the same. Accord-
ingly, rather than suggesting we abandon the concept of global health security, 
this article seeks to nuance the terms of the debate and recognize the benefits 
which could be reaped from doing so. Beyond financing, moving an issue up a 
political agenda through securitization facilitates concentrated activity in response 
to an emerging outbreak. The urgency with which several Latin American govern-
ments moved to respond to the Zika outbreak, once it was securitized, resulted in 
a significant reduction in the mosquito population and thereby in the incidence 
of infection.85 This had the added impact of also reducing cases of dengue fever, 
chikungunya and yellow fever, which share the same vector, and arguably cause 
greater morbidity and mortality, yet never feature in the global health security 
landscape and therefore were not previously able to benefit from attention on the 
same scale as Zika. 
Moreover, the global health security narrative has led to significant changes in 
the global health landscape through the global health security regime. The creation 
of the Global Health Security Agenda, for example, and of the WHO’s Global 
82 Gorik Ooms, Claudia Beiersmann, Walter Flores, Johanna Hanefeld, Olaf Muller, Moses Mulumba, Trygve 
Ottersen, Malabika Sarker and Albrecht Jahn, ‘Synergies and tensions between universal health coverage and 
global health security: why we need a second “maximizing positive synergies” initiative’, BMJ Global Health 
2: 1, 2017, e000217.
83 Rushton, Security and public health.
84 J. Michaud, J. Kates, A. Wexler and A. Valentine, The US response to Ebola: status of the FY2015 emergency Ebola 
appropriation (Washington DC: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015); S. Epstein and A. Lister, Supple-
mental appropriations for Zika response: the FY2016 conference agreement in brief (Washington DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2016).
85 Jon Cohen, ‘Where has all the Zika gone?’, Science 357: 6352, 2017, pp. 631–2.
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Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and its Health Emergen-
cies Programme (HEP), established to ensure health security across the world, 
have significantly changed how we view global health governance. Not only did 
GOARN facilitate easier engagement between non-state and state actors, champi-
oning the move from international to global disease governance, the creation 
of the HEP has fundamentally shifted the WHO from the role of a normative 
technical adviser to that of an operational actor in global health security. This 
institutional structure is supplemented by a range of NGOs and non-state actors 
that comprise the global health security regime. Although there are challenges 
relating to coordination and efficiency among these disparate bodies, the global 
health security regime, governed by novel forms of legislation such as the IHR 
(2005), represents one of the best examples of international cooperation for any 
governance issue, and arguably this would not have occurred had health not been 
securitized and political priority given to cross-border infectious disease control. 
Perhaps more pertinently, despite its numerous critics,86 global health security has 
proved it can fulfil its raison d’être: to reduce the spread of pathogens with pandemic 
potential. As a global community, we still need this discursive and operational tool 
to maintain the necessary momentum in limiting potential outbreaks. The highest 
level of urgency would be embodied in the global health emergency; and at the 
same time the legitimacy of action at this level would be sustained through the 
use of more nuanced terminology to identify global health security crises, threats, 
risks and concerns. We, as a global health community, need to reconsider what is 
meant by health security and think about the risks posed to the longevity of the 
concept by its indiscriminate use. 
Conclusion
This article has described the development of the health security framework, 
emphasizing the point that ‘health security’ does not have a unitary meaning and 
tracing the security–health nexus from its history as a discursive tool, based on 
the Copenhagen School’s speech act, to contemporary health security practice, 
involving a broad range of securitized health concerns, the military’s boots on 
the ground in health emergencies, and the ontological concern of global health 
security activity itself coming under threat. These developments not only repre-
sent a departure for health security conceptually and operationally, but pose 
concerns for the longevity of global health security. We need to question these 
recent trends to analyse what implications they have for the goal of infectious 
disease control, particularly around issues of sustainability and how to mitigate 
future security risks posed by global health security activity. 
I propose that one way to overcome some of the new challenges in global health 
security is to change the terms of debate, allowing for greater consensus on what is 
86 Adam Kamradt-Scott, ‘Who’s to blame? The World Health Organization and the 2014 Ebola outbreak in west 
Africa’, Third World Quarterly 37: 3, 2016, pp. 410–18; Colin McInnes, ‘Crisis! What crisis? Global health and 
the 2014–15 west African Ebola outbreak’, Third World Quarterly 37: 3, 2016, pp. 380–400.
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 h
ttp
s
://a
c
a
d
e
m
ic
.o
u
p
.c
o
m
/ia
/a
rtic
le
-a
b
s
tra
c
t/9
5
/5
/1
0
9
3
/5
5
5
6
7
5
2
 b
y
 L
o
n
d
o
n
 S
c
h
o
o
l o
f E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s
 u
s
e
r o
n
 0
5
 N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r 2
0
1
9
Clare Wenham
1110
International Affairs 95: 5, 2019
a global health emergency compared to a global health security crisis, global health 
security threat or global health security concern. This more nuanced approach 
could create differing path dependencies, ensuring the legitimacy of global efforts 
for the ‘big one’ and limiting ultra-securitization involving the military, with the 
risks this poses to health care workers in health security delivery.
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